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For Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur, January 2001
TOWARD SUPRANATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW? THE WTO PANEL DECISION
AND THE “THREE-STEP TEST” FOR COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS
Jane C. Ginsburg, Professor, Columbia University School of Law1
Abstract
A dispute resolution panel of the World Trade Organization in June 2000 held the
United States in contravention of its obligation under art. 13 of the TRIPs accord to
"confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the right holder.” In the dispute resolution proceeding,
initiated by the European Union at the behest of the Irish performing rights
organization, the contested exception, enacted in the 1998 "Digital Millennium
Copyright Act," exempted a broad range of retail and restaurant establishments from
liability for the public performance of musical works by means of communication of
radio and television transmissions.
The WTO panel decision marks the first time an international adjudicative body has
interpreted either art. 13 of TRIPs, or art. 9.2 of the Berne Convention, the text
TRIPs incorporates, and generalizes from the Berne Convention reproduction right
to all TRIPs and Berne rights under copyright. Berne art. 9.2/TRIPs art. 13 impose
the "three-step test" to evaluate the legitimacy of exceptions and limitations on
copyright; the panel=s decision extensively analyzes each of the steps. As other
multilateral instruments, such as the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty (art. 10) and
WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty (art. 16.2), as well as the pending
European Union Information Society Directive (art. 5.4), increasingly adopt the
“three-step test," the WTO Panel decision may significantly advance the development
of a truly supra national law of copyright.
This article will analyze the Panel's interpretation of the test=s three steps, and their
application to the U.S.-law exemption. The article will also compare the Panel=s
treatment of the three-step test with the prior analyses proposed by several Berne
Convention commentators, in order to reflect on what the Panel=s analysis might mean
for copyright exceptions more broadly. It is important to recognize, however, that
the decision=s actual impact on international copyright law will also depend on other
considerations that will not be addressed here, including: Member State compliance
with Panel decisions; the precedential effect of one Panel decision on later dispute
resolution panels; and the willingness of national courts to look to WTO Panel
decisions for guidance in evaluating local exceptions.
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Introduction
A dispute resolution panel of the World Trade Organization in June 2000 held the United
States in contravention of its obligation under art. 13 of the TRIPs accord to “confine limitations
or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder.” In the dispute resolution proceeding, initiated by the European Union at the behest of
the Irish performing rights organization, the contested exception, enacted in the 1998 “Digital
Millennium Copyright Act,” exempted a broad range of retail and restaurant establishments from
liability for the public performance of musical works by means of communication of radio and
television transmissions.
The WTO panel decision marks the first time an international adjudicative body has
interpreted either art. 13 of TRIPs, or art. 9.2 of the Berne Convention, the text TRIPs
incorporates, and generalizes from the Berne Convention reproduction right to all TRIPs and
Berne rights under copyright. Berne art. 9.2/TRIPs art. 13 impose the “three-step test” to
evaluate the legitimacy of exceptions and limitations on copyright; the panel’s decision extensively
analyzes each of the steps. As other multilateral instruments, such as the 1996 WIPO Copyright
Treaty (art. 10) and WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty (art. 16.2), as well as the pending
European Union Information Society Directive (art. 5.4), increasingly adopt the “three-step test,”
the WTO Panel decision may significantly advance the development of a truly supra national law
of copyright.
This article will analyze the Panel’s interpretation of the test’s three steps, and their
application to the U.S.-law exemption (I). The article will also compare the Panel’s treatment of
the three-step test with the prior analyses proposed by several Berne Convention commentators,
in order to reflect on what the Panel’s analysis might mean for copyright exceptions more broadly
(II). It is important to recognize, however, that the decision’s actual impact on international
copyright law will also depend on other considerations that will not be addressed here, including:
Member State compliance with Panel decisions; the precedential effect of one Panel decision on
later dispute resolution panels; and the willingness of national courts to look to WTO Panel
decisions for guidance in evaluating local exceptions.
I

The Panel’s Decision

The U.S. exemption that the Panel invalidated applied to the public performance of radio
or television transmissions of non dramatic musical works by:
! any business establishment with less than 2000 gross square feet of space, and
! any food service or drinking establishment that has less than 3750 gross square feet of
space,
! If the establishment is 2000 gross square feet or more, or if the food service or drinking
establishment is 3750 gross square feet or more, the establishment will nonetheless be
exempt, if :
3

! the performance of the radio transmission incorporating nondramatic musical
compositions is “communicated by means of a total of not more than 6
loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or
adjoining outdoor space,” or
!the performance of a television transmission incorporating nondramatic musical
compositions is “communicated by means of a total of not more than 4 audiovisual
devices, of which not more than one audiovisual device is located in any 1 room,
and no such audiovisual device has a diagonal screen size greater than 55 inches,
and any audio portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of
a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers
are located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor space.”2
The 1998 exception significantly enlarged a preexisting exemption, for the
“communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display of a work by the public
reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private
homes . . .”3 The EU also, but unsuccessfully, challenged this exception.
The EU contended that the U.S. section 110(5) exemptions violated U.S. TRIPs
obligations because they conflicted with arts. 11(1)(ii) and 11bis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention
(incorporated through art. 9.1 of TRIPs).4 Art. 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention grants to
authors of dramatic and musical works the exclusive right to authorize “any communication to the
public of the performance of their works”. Art. 11bis(1)(iii) grants to authors of artistic works
(which includes nondramatic and other musical works) the exclusive right of authorizing “the
public communication by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument transmitting, by signs,
sounds or images, the broadcast of the work”. Art. 11bis(2) permits member countries to
determine how the transmission right shall be exercised, but, in preserving the author’s “right to
obtain equitable remuneration,” appears to preclude outright exemptions.
The US responded that the apparent inconsistency of section 110(5) with Berne Conv.
arts. 11(1)(ii) and 11bis(1)(iii) did not constitute a violation of TRIPs because the exceptions
came within the scope of TRIPs art. 13. As a threshold matter, this defense required the Panel to
address the relationship between exceptions set forth in the Berne Convention, as incorporated in
TRIPs, and the general TRIPs art. 13 exception. The EU had asserted that art. 13 should apply
only to the rights newly introduced into TRIPs; it should not provide an additional or broader
defense to a violation of a preexisting Berne Convention right. To expand the exceptions
previously set out or implied into the Berne Convention would violate that Treaty’s art. 20, which
permits Union member countries to enter into agreements granting more extensive rights, but
which, by implication, prohibits agreements reducing Berne Convention rights, argued the EU.
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The EU further claimed that, under the Berne Convention, the disputed exception could not
exceed the scope of the “minor exceptions” implied into the public performance right.5
The Panel determined that TRIPs art. 9.1 incorporated not only the Berne Convention
text, but also its acquis, that is, the context of each provision’s enactment, and their prevailing
interpretations. Thus, the “minor exceptions” doctrine should be deemed incorporated as well.
On the question whether the scope of TRIPS art. 13 exceeds the scope of “minor exceptions,” the
Panel agreed with the U.S. position that art. 13 “clarifies and articulates the standards applicable
to minor exceptions under the Berne Convention” but does not enlarge it.6
Having equated performance rights “minor exceptions” with exceptions permitted under
the three-step test, the Panel went on to assess the merits of § 110(5) in light of that test. The
panel determined that § 110(5)(B) failed to meet any of the test’s criteria .
A.

“Certain special cases”

The Panel observed that the terms of art. 13 precluded exceptions of broad general
application. The scope of the exception must be well-defined (“certain”), and narrowly limited
(“special”). The Panel considered whether “special” also implied a requirement that a laudable
public purpose underlie the exception, but declined to undertake the evaluation of local public
policy that such an interpretation would compel. Rather, citing the determinations of other WTO
adjudicative bodies, the Panel “rejected interpretative tests based on the subjective aims of the
national legislation.”7
The Panel emphasized that § 110(5)(B)’s broad business exception well exceeded “certain
special cases” (by contrast, it deemed the “homestyle” exception sufficiently limited to meet this
standard); the term “requires that a limitation or exception in national legislation should be clearly
defined and should be narrow in its scope and reach.” While § 110(5)(B) may be clearly defined,
it could hardly be deemed “narrow” when, according to a studies quoted by the Panel, 73 % of all
eating establishments, 70% of all drinking establishments, and 45% of all retail establishments, fall
below § 110(5)(B)'s size limits, and therefore benefit from the exemption. By contrast, 16% of
eating establishments, 13.5% of drinking establishments, and 18% of retail establishments
benefitted from the “homestyle” exemption.8 Moreover, the scope of the “homestyle” exception
was narrower as to the type of work: While the text of § 110(5)(A) states “a work,” the Panel and
5
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parties determined that, in context with § 110(5)(B)’s treatment of non dramatic musical works,
the scope of § 110(5)(A) should be understood as limited to dramatic musical works.9 That
limitation kept the § 110(5)(A) exception within the confines of narrow specificity required by the
Panel’s interpretation.10
The Panel rejected the EU’s contention that the “homestyle” exception might significantly
overflow its current contours, as equipment “commonly used in a private home” becomes
increasingly sophisticated, and particularly if that equipment enables transmission over the
Internet.11 The panel acknowledged the possibility that new technologies might render certain
uses no longer “certain special cases,” but stated that it was evaluating the current scope of the
exception based on current technology.12 The Panel’s refusal to take into account potential new
technologies in assessing the scope of the exception should be contrasted with the Panel’s
assessment of the role of new technologies and new uses on the impact of the exception on the
normal exploitation of a work.
B.

“That do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work”

The Panel first addressed whether the term “normal” was “empirical” or “normative,” that
is, whether it denoted the way in which the work is in fact exploited, or whether it (also) implied
that the nature of the exploitation was potential, permissible or desirable. The Panel determined
that both connotations were appropriate.13
On the empirical side, the U.S. argued that the Panel should not address individual rights
in isolation, but the package of rights in the work as a whole. Because music right holders’
principal remuneration comes from “primary” performance and broadcasting – such as live
performance or payment from a broadcaster in order to transmit the work – and § 110(5) relates
only to “secondary” broadcasts, the U.S. contended that retransmissions of radio broadcasts were
insignificant compared to the “normal,” i.e., dominant, exploitation of the work.14 The panel
rejected this argument and agreed with the EU that each right must be considered in isolation.
The panel emphasized that “possible conflict with a normal exploitation of a particular exclusive
right cannot be counterbalanced or justified by a mere fact of the absence of conflict with a
normal exploitation of another exclusive right, even if the exploitation of the latter right would
generate more income.”15 The Panel emphasized that the Berne Convention accords both primary
9
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and secondary transmission rights (see arts. 11(1)(ii) and 11bis(1)(iii)), each of which may
“normally” be exercised separately. The U.S. interpretation, however, would collapse the distinct
rights, because it would disregard the conflict with individual rights, so long as exercise of the
principal right were not compromised.
Turning to the “normative” connotation of “normal exploitation,” the Panel looked to
documents prepared for the 1967 Stockholm Revision Conference that drafted art. 9.2 of the
Berne Convention.16 Citing a report of the Swedish government and BIRPI (Bureaux for the
Protection of Intellectual Property, the predecessor organization to WIPO), the Panel indicated
that the disputed exception “should not enter into economic competition” with the right holder:
according to the report, “all forms of exploiting a work, which have, or are likely to acquire,
considerable economic or practical importance, must be reserved to the authors.”17 “Thus,” the
Panel continued, “it appears that one way of measuring the normative connotation of normal
exploitation is to consider, in addition to those forms of exploitation that currently generate
significant or tangible revenue, those forms of exploitation which, with a certain degree of
likelihood and plausibility, could acquire considerable economic or practical importance.”18
The Panel’s cautious characterization of this test as “one way of measuring” the normalcy
of an exploitation leaves open the possibility that other measures might also apply. The Panel
emphasized in any event that not every commercial use of a work necessarily enters into conflict
with a normal exploitation of it.19 Ultimately, the Panel stated:
We believe that an exception or limitation to an exclusive right in domestic legislation rises
to the level of a conflict with a normal exploitation of the work . . . if uses, that in principle
are covered by that right but exempted under the exception or limitation, enter into
economic competition with the ways that right holders normally extract economic value
from that right to the work . . . and thereby deprive them of significant or tangible
commercial gains.20
The panel indicated that current licensing practices do not necessarily define the normal
extraction of economic value. These practices would not afford a “sufficient guideline” if, for
example, the law of the country at issue does not confer exclusive rights in a particular use, or
where, “due to lack of effective or affordable means of enforcement, right holders do not find it
16

The Panel also noted Professor Ricketson’s characterization of a “normal exploitation” as covering “the ways in
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worthwhile or practical to exercise their rights.”21 This caveat suggests that a “normal
exploitation” may be an idealized one: if the exploitation falls within the scope of the copyright,
and no copyright or related cultural policies undergird the right holder’s disability from exercising
the right, then the exploitation may, as a normative matter, be “normal.” Significantly, the Panel
declined to assess the “normalcy” of the exploitation in the disputed country by reference to the
exercise of rights in other economically-comparable WTO countries. The Panel did not foreclose
that kind of analysis; it simply found it unnecessary in the case before it.22
Applying the “economic competition” standard, the Panel ruled the § 110(5)(B) business
exemption impermissible. The Panel observed, inter alia, that rights owners license business
establishments to play live and recorded music, while § 110(5)(B) eliminates the basis for
licensing the same establishments with respect to performing works via broadcast radio and
television. If the market as a whole is music performed in business establishments, then the
exemption of broadcasts significantly compromises the copyright owner’s opportunity for
commercial gain. Even were the markets separated into live and prerecorded music on the one
hand, and broadcasts on the other, the exemption for broadcasts competes with the exploitation of
the other market because it provides business establishments an incentive to shift from paying
modes of exploitation to exempt modes of exploitation.23
By contrast, the Panel held that the § 110(5)(A) homestyle exception did not “conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work” because it appeared to the Panel to be of little economic
or practical importance.24 The exception covered only a small percentage of establishments, and,
according to the interpretation acknowledged by both the U.S. and the E.U., reached only
dramatic musical works. The panel also observed that in the U.S., collective licensing societies do
not administer the public performance rights in dramatic musical works; as a result, right holders
do not normally license the right to retransmit broadcast performances of dramatic works to the
small establishments covered by the homestyle exception.
C.

“And that do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder”

At the outset of its analysis of the third step, the Panel observed that three terms required
definition: “interests,” “legitimate,” and “unreasonable.” The Panel determined that “interests”
need not be “limited to actual or potential economic advantage or detriment.”25 The panel thus
may have left the door open to non economic considerations (despite the exclusion of Berne

21
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Conv. art. 6bis from TRIPs incorporation); the current controversy, however, implicated only
economic interests.
As for “legitimate,” the Panel adduced both a “legal positivist” perspective (authorized or
protected by law), and “a more normative perspective, in the context of calling for the protection
of interests that are justifiable in the light of objectives that underlie the protection of exclusive
rights.”26 Although the Panel did not further elaborate on the normative content of the right
holder’s “legitimate” interests, one might suppose that, for example, censorship would not be one
of these. Thus, an author would not have a “legitimate” interest in preventing publication of an
unfavorable book review: an exception that allowed quotations for purposes of criticism would
therefore not harm the author’s “legitimate”interests, even if the resulting book review depressed
the book’s sales. The § 110(5) controversy, it bears emphasis, concerned a pork barrel exemption
purely for the benefit of certain business consumers of copyrighted works; it did not implicate any
of the free speech or scholarship interests that underlie many other copyright exceptions. As a
result, the Panel decision does not purport to offer guidance toward analyzing the “legitimacy” of
right holder interests when they are confronted with the creative interests of other authors.
With regard to tolerable levels of “prejudice,” the Panel noted that the text’s formulation,
“not unreasonably prejudice” “connotes a slightly stricter standard” than “reasonable.”27 While
acknowledging that the treaty text permits copyright owner’s interests to undergo some prejudice,
the Panel determined that the prejudice would reach an “unreasonable” level “if an exception or
limitation causes or has the potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright
owner.”28 Citing the “persuasive value” of the WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention, the Panel
noted that the prejudice might be brought back to tolerable levels were compensation at least
provided: “in cases where there would be a serious loss of profit for the copyright owner, the law
should provide him with some compensation (a system of compulsory licensing with equitable
remuneration).”29 The U.S. exception, however, imposed an outright exemption, it did not offer
any compensation.
Applying these standards to § 110(5)(B), the Panel rejected the U.S. argument that there
was no “unreasonable” prejudice because, as a result of collective licensing of radio and television
transmissions, right holders already received compensation for primary transmissions. The U.S.
had endeavored to characterize the secondary transmissions effected by business establishments as
incidental, and therefore too insignificant for their exemption to be deemed “unreasonable.” The
Panel, however, emphasized the distinct nature of each exclusive right; thus the retransmission
right under Berne Convention art. 11bis(iii) must be considered separately from the public
communication right under art. 11(1)(ii). In evaluating the prejudice, the Panel did not limit itself
to the loss actually suffered by EU copyright owners. The U.S. had calculated that the maximum
26
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effect of the § 110(5)(B) exemption was to reduce the licensing income by less than 5%, a de
minimis and therefore reasonable amount, according to the U.S. The Panel instead emphasized
that it was necessary to take into account not only current losses (which, might, indeed, have been
deemed “reasonable”) but also potential losses. The Panel ruled that the party asserting the
legitimacy of the exception bore the burden of proof of reasonableness, and that the U.S. had not
made a convincing showing that the potential harm would not be “unreasonable.”30 By contrast,
the Panel accepted the homestyle exception because it exempted only a relatively small number of
establishments, and the evidence showed that secondary transmissions of dramatic works were
not a significant source of income for right holders.31

II

The Panel Decision’s Analysis in Light of Other Interpretations of the Three Step
Test and Its Broader Implications for Copyright Exceptions

Under the Panel’s decision, to survive scrutiny under TRIPs art. 13, the member state
defending the challenged exemption or limitation bears the burden of showing:
(1) That the exemption is limited to a narrow and specifically defined class of uses
[“certain special cases”], but the member state need not demonstrate or justify the local
policy that underlies the exception;
(2) That the exempted use does not compete with an actual or potential source of
economic gain from the ways right holders normally exercise rights under copyright
[“conflict with a normal exploitation of the work”]; and
(3) That the exempted use does not unreasonably harm right holder interests that are
justifiable in light of general copyright objectives [“not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the rightholder”]; the unreasonableness of the harm may be allayed if
the member state imposes a compensation-ensuring compulsory license in lieu of an
outright exemption.
Let us now compare the Panel’s approach with the analyses offered by the leading
commentators of the Berne Convention. By elucidating where the Panel decision comports with,
and where it departs from, leading commentators, we hope to sharpen the analysis of the Panel
decision’s implications for other copyright exceptions. Reference to Berne Convention
commentators is warranted because the three step test in TRIPs art. 13 derives from art. 9(2) of
the Berne Convention. Art. 9(2) was the counterpart to the art. 9(1) right of reproduction
introduced into Berne in the 1967 Stockholm Revision, and adopted in the 1971 Paris Act.
Although most countries in the Berne Union recognized the right of reproduction before the
right’s Stockholm codification, Union members provided for different exceptions to the scope of
the right. As a result, the Stockholm drafters confronted the task of devising guidelines that
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would pose meaningful constraints on the creation of exceptions, yet accommodate existing
member state exceptions.32 Not surprisingly, this effort sparked extensive debate and revision of
the proposed text.33
Before the WTO Panel decision, no adjudicative body had construed the meaning of art.
9(2). As for the provision’s “legislative history,” we have seen that the Swedish/BIRPI Study
Group that proposed the first version of what ultimately became art. 9(2), focused on the
“economic competition” that the exempted use would pose to the copyright holder. In his 1987
treatise, The Berne Convention: 1886-1986, Professor Ricketson extensively reviewed other
preparatory documents in an effort to articulate the meaning of art. 9(2). As the leading authority
on the Berne Convention, Professor Ricketson’s interpretation of the three-step test merits
particular attention. The WTO Panel also noted the “persuasive value” of the 1978 WIPO Guide
to the Berne Convention, authored by Claude Masouyé, then-Director of WIPO’s copyright
division. In comparing the Panel’s analysis with that of other commentators, we will also take
account of another important source for interpreting the three-step test: the 1976 treatise by
Desbois, André Françon, and André Kéréver, Les Conventions Internationales du Droit d’Auteur
et des Droits Voisins.
A.

“Certain special cases”

Of the three commentators discussed here, only Professor Ricketson proposes a detailed
analysis of the first step. He offers a two-part reading. First, the exception must be for a specific
purpose; exceptions covering a broad range of subject matter or of uses would not be permissible.
Second, an exception must be justified by some “clear reason of public policy or some other
exceptional circumstance.”34 As we have seen, the Panel decision rejected the second
interpretation.35 The drafting history of art 9(2) is scant on this point. Professor Ricketson
quotes some of the alternative terminology submitted during the drafting process: the terms
“particular” and “specific” appear in some drafts in lieu of “special.”36 Arguably, the term
“special” carries more normative connotations than “particular” or “specific.” In the absence of a
record of debate on the choice of “special,” however, it is not apparent that the drafters intended
to incorporate a policy justification into the first step of the test.
Moreover, the drafting history regarding “normal exploitation” suggests that “certain
special cases”does not necessarily have a normative dimension. As the Panel decision explains in
its analysis of the second step, the term “normal exploitation” was understood to accommodate
the perpetuation of the accretion of local exceptions already in place at the time of art. 9's

32
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33

Id. ¶¶ 9.3-5.

34

RICKETSON, ¶ 9.6.

35

Panel decision ¶¶ 6.111-112

36

RICKETSON, ¶¶ 9.3-9.5
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adoption.37 Although the Stockholm study quoted by the Panel referred to “domestic laws
already contain[ing] a series of exceptions in favour of various public and cultural interests,”38 it is
not clear that all of these exceptions could in fact claim persuasive policy underpinnings. Because
art. 9(2) creates a hierarchy of analysis – that is, step one is the threshold to be crossed before
analysis of the other criteria may be undertaken – an adjudicator would not need to reach the
question of “normal exploitation” if the “certain special cases” condition were not satisfied.39 As
a result, if the drafters were positing compatibility of preexisting national exceptions with “normal
exploitation,” they must have assumed the exceptions qualified as “certain special cases.” If not
all those preexisting exceptions could boast a strong policy justification, then “special cases” can
include unworthy as well as laudable exceptions, so long as they are sufficiently narrow. The
normative inquiry is deferred to the second two steps.
Finally, in the opinion of this writer, the Panel decision correctly eschewed inquiry into
the motivation for a particular exception. The record of the 1967 and 1971 Acts does not clearly
preclude pork barrel-type exceptions (if they are sufficiently discrete), and the WTO may be illsuited to condemn local giveaways of this kind. Recall that no exemption, however worthy the
policy underlying it, will survive scrutiny if it “conflicts with a normal exploitation” or
“unreasonably prejudices the legitimate interests of the right holder.” If there are trade
distortions, they will arise from non compliance with the second or third steps. It is not clear that
a dubious purpose, standing alone, would give rise to a trade distortion. By rejecting a normative
component to the first step, the Panel avoided embroiling itself in evaluating the merits of local
policy determinations (or of local concessions to powerful lobbies). Exercising diplomatic caution
in this case, moreover, does not undermine the essential inquiry, since bad consequences of bad
policy decisions may be redressed through application of the second and third steps.
B.

“Normal exploitation”

All three commentators address the second step. Professor Ricketson posits that
“common sense” indicates that “normal exploitation” refers simply to “the ways in which an
author might reasonably be expected to exploit his work in the normal course of events.” There
are some uses an author would not normally expect to be paid for, even though they fall within
the literal scope of the right, for example, copying a work for use in court proceedings.
Receiving payment for these kinds of uses therefore would exceed the work’s normal
exploitation. The normalcy of the exploitation, however, may depend on the nature of the work
at issue.40 In a later commentary, Professor Ricketson further indicates that there might be no
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conflict with a normal exploitation when “there is no realistic possibility that the copyright owner
would be able to enforce her rights, either by way of refusing permission or obtaining a fee by
free negotiation . . .”41 This suggests that the “normal” exploitation of a work may change with
technology or other developments. Uses whose control once presented excessively high
transaction costs might today or tomorrow be more susceptible to effective licensing, and
therefore might enter the fold of “normal exploitations.”42 This kind of analysis shows, however,
as Professor Paul Goldstein has remarked, that “an obvious circularity underlies” the “normal
exploitation” criterion. “At least historically, an author will normally exploit a work only in those
markets where he is assured of legal rights; by definition, markets for exempted uses fall outside
the range of normal exploitation. Consequently, it might be thought that to expand an exemption
is to shrink the “normal market,’ while to expand the definition of ‘normal market’ is to shrink
the permitted exception.”43
Professor Goldstein would avoid this “logical paradox” by reference to the WIPO
Guide’s approach, which appears to privilege the current or anticipated principal means of
producing and vending particular kinds of works (the example given in the WIPO Guide is the
printing and sale of novels and school books; Professor Goldstein suggests that the marketing of
audiovisual works on DVD is another, even if little such marketing has yet occurred today).44
The WIPO Guide otherwise offers little analysis of what constitutes a “normal” exploitation.
The WIPO Guide emphasizes that if the exception conflicts with a normal exploitation, it is
impermissible. As a result, the compromise measure of compulsory licensing, which comes into
play when there is no conflict with a normal exploitation, but when the exception unreasonably
prejudices the author’s legitimate interests, would not be appropriate.
The Desbois, Françon, Kéréver treatise also stresses that absence of conflict with a
normal exploitation is a “sine qua non -- only if this condition is satisfied is there reason to
concern oneself with whether the [third] is satisfied or not.”45 This treatise does not substantially
elaborate on the meaning of “normal exploitation,” however, except by way of an example
comparing “normal exploitation” with “unreasonable prejudice.” The treatise suggests that
photocopying large numbers of copies would conflict with a normal exploitation; systematic,
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institutional photocopying of single copies would not conflict, but could unreasonably prejudice
the author’s legitimate interests, and therefore could be made subject to a compulsory license.46
These sources’ inquiry into the “normalcy” of the exploitation appears to focus primarily
on what the Panel called the “empirical” aspect of the term “normal exploitation.” The issue
seems to be whether today the right owner is, or tomorrow will be, in fact exploiting a particular
market. Most do not clearly confront the “normative” dimension that the Panel further perceived
in the second step, although Professor Ricketson’s reference to “the ways in which an author
might reasonably be expected to exploit his work” (emphasis supplied) hints at a normative, as
well as an empirical, criterion. That said, having announced the existence of a normative
dimension, the Panel did not clearly articulate its content. In fact, the Panel’s suggestion that one
might discern the normative connotations of the second step by considering “those forms of
exploitation which, with a certain degree of likelihood and plausibility, could acquire
considerable economic or practical importance,”47 seems more like a direction to anticipate what
the empirical situation will be, than an explanation of what the right holder’s markets should
cover. Admittedly, as observed earlier, the case before the WTO Panel did not present
significant normative difficulties, since the pork barrel exception at issue did not further speech,
scholarship, or other creative activities often fostered by copyright exceptions.
The absence of a genuine normative problem could lead one to oversimplify the synthesis
of the Panel decision and other authorities. Arguably, any economically significant exploitation
that the right holder realistically can, or will be able to, individually license comes within the
scope of a “normal exploitation.” So stated, however, there is a risk that even traditionally
privileged uses, such as scholarship or parody, could be deemed “normal exploitations,”
assuming copyright owners could develop a low transactions cost method of charging for them.
It is not sufficient to reply that the desirability of charging for these uses may be addressed as
part of the step three inquiry into the “legitimate” interests of the author: the authorities agree
that one does not get to step three if the exception conflicts with a “normal exploitation.” As a
result, it is all the more important to bear in mind the factual context of the Panel decision.
Should a controversy requiring examination of a speech- or scholarship-motivated exception
under the three-step test come before a WTO Panel, or, for that matter, a member state court,
that institution should consider whether, as a normative matter, there is a “market” for criticism
and similar kinds of uses that the copyright owner should control.48
The predominantly economic focus of the Panel’s analysis may be very useful in
evaluating “market failure” and similarly economically-motivated exceptions, but still may prove
too much, if the result is to outlaw the exception entirely, rather than remitting it to review under
the more conciliatory third step of the test. Consider, for example, private copying. If de
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minimis impact or practical unenforceability have historically justified private copying exceptions,
then modern technology considerably belies both premises. Were those the only justifications,
then one would be tempted to conclude that private copying exceptions today conflict with a
normal exploitation. If they so conflict, then there should be no private copying exception, even
alleviated by a compulsory license. Were there also a non economic motivation for the
exception, by contrast, it would be appropriate to develop the neglected normative dimension of
“normal” exploitation. Suppose that justification were privacy or personal autonomy; one might
contend that an author may not “reasonably be expected to exploit his work” in a manner that
intrudes on end-user (as opposed to intermediary) autonomy. Of course, this argument threatens
to prove too much the other way; it does, nonetheless, open the door to further inquiry under the
third step.
C.

“Unreasonably prejudice legitimate interests”

The authorities agree that the third step specifies “unreasonable” prejudice, because some
prejudice will flow from any exception.49 While the text of art. 9(2) does not refer explicitly to
compulsory licenses, the preparatory documents and the commentators concur that the harm may
be rendered “reasonable” if the author is equitably compensated, including by means of a
compulsory license.50 This does not mean that every exception should entail a compulsory
license. Compulsory licenses that “conflict with a normal exploitation,” for example, that pricefix where the market would otherwise permit transactional licensing, and that lack sufficient non
economic justification, should fail the second step.51 By the same token, some exceptions will
cause so little prejudice that the compromise measure of a compulsory license would not be
required.
“Reasonableness” here appears to be an economic criterion. The Panel also alluded to
normative criteria in its evocation of the “legitimate interests” of the right holders, but the
commentators examined here do not directly discuss this component of the third step. As a
general matter, the same normative concerns that advocated against a purely economic
evaluation of “normal exploitation” should similarly inform the analysis of whether the right
holder’s interests are “legitimate.” The “general copyright objectives” that the Panel evoked
certainly include solicitude for the creativity of second authors. Hence the illegitimacy of an
author’s interest in silencing criticism. Where the author’s interest is not legitimate, it appears
that no compensation is owing, even by means of a compulsory license.
But what should the analysis be when the legitimacy of the author’s interest may vary
with the intensity with which it is asserted? That is, the author may have a legitimate interest in
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being paid for the use; she may have a less legitimate interest in preventing it altogether.52 In that
event, the legitimacy criterion seems to collapse into the “reasonableness” inquiry, at least where
the author’s interests are economic. Again consider private copying. Authors do have
“legitimate interests” in stemming private copying, particularly in the digital environment, given
its proclivities to massive multiplication of “private” copies. Indeed, an exception for large-scale
“private” copying of the “sharing” type might well conflict with a normal exploitation (assuming
the copyright could be enforced in this kind of situation). But if the copying remained truly
private, rather than “shared,” there may be a countervailing legitimacy to consider (even if, in this
writer’s view, enhancing the convenience of consumptive end-users is not a “general copyright
objective”). This suggests that the third step may reduce to a balancing of the legitimacy of the
interests of the right holders and of the beneficiaries of the exception. Where the right holder’s
interests significantly outweigh the beneficiaries’, the exception should be prohibited; where the
interests appear more or less balanced, a compulsory license may be imposed, and where the
beneficiaries’ interests significantly outweigh the right holder’s, an outright exemption should be
allowed.
Balancing tests are, however, notoriously imprecise, and tend to be more of a common
law than a civilian adjudicative method. That does not recommend them as a supra-nationally or
multi-nationally acceptable mode of analysis. That said, the reasonableness (if not also the
legitimacy) criterion of step three by its own terms requires some weighing of conflicting
interests; whether or not the prejudice is “reasonable” must be appreciated by reference to other
values. Ultimately, analysis of the three step test will lead the adjudicator from the rather
straightforward criteria of the first step, to the potentially manipulable “normal exploitation”
second step, to the interpretative uncertainties of the “reasonableness” inquiry. As a result, the
Panel decision may have clarified the terms of reference, but it may not have made future
outcomes any more predictable.
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